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eminence, having much in common with the monomania of insanity."

We can not know truly whether Hamlet was mad or not. But we can describe his symptoms and define his psychosis. He appears to have had an over-fondness for logic. When he was craziest he used it most. In his maddest moments he seems to have been the coolest and most sane. "Though this be madness," as the garrulous and meddlesome but after all very wise Polonius remarked, "yet there's method in't." The method is a denial of the social compromise. Much logic is a splendid barricade.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Mind-Energy. HENRI BERGSON. Translated by WILDON CARR. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1920. Pp. x + 262.

The philosophy of Bergson has had the fortune of producing a wide range of reactions. His philosophy has had an appeal surpassing the limits of the academic world and transcending the group of technical students of philosophy and even of science. Even within the academic world, acquaintance with his work has not been confined to the philosophers. Largely owing to the vitalistic controversy, the biologists have read Bergson. According to their several dispositions and convictions, they have applauded him, have remained indifferent, or have been repelled by him. Perhaps Bergson's position in the eyes of the specialists, of other than philosophical fields, who have found his doctrine congenial is due primarily to the utility of his work for purposes of vitalistic apologetics. Again, theologians have found him acceptable or unacceptable—but at any rate, many have read his books. Beyond the academic circle, his philosophical fortunes have again been varied. In some groups, his doctrines have been a fashion. With others it has had a serious, if diffused, meaning for their personal views on life. Finally, it seems that certain writers whose social views are called radical by the newspapers, have grounded their doctrine upon Bergsonian ideas as a metaphysical basis.

There are several reasons for this extension of influence. It is unnecessary to dwell upon stylistic attractions. A deeper reason can be gathered by noting the points at which this philosophy makes its contact with the lay mind. If such a manner of statement be permissible, it might be said that the doctrine is up-to-date. It is noteworthy that *Creative Evolution* has been far more widely read than *Matter and Memory* and *Time and Free Will*. In com-

paratively recent times, what may be called the biological point of view has become popular. Certain of its generalizations and its evolutionary standpoint have become part of the general information of the educated. How much distortion of scientific principles this has involved we need not stop to inquire. The consequence is that Bergsonian doctrines possess an interest that arises not so much from its strictly philosophical teachings as from its biological atmosphere, its relation to the mechanistic-vitalistic controversy, and the bearing, in turn, of this upon theological and ethical questions of common interest. In the writer's opinion, these and similar considerations make it difficult to place Bergson's doctrine in the proper perspective. The doctrines concerning vitalism, the evolution of life, "creationism," and much that is therewith connected, are in part corollaries and in part applications and illustrations of the fundamental doctrines concerning duration, space, mind and matter. At least, if we assume the contentions of *Time and Free Will*, and of *Matter and Memory*, a large part of *Creative Evolution* follows without difficulty, as corollary and illustration. And, correspondingly, the central problem of this philosophy lies back of the third book, while in the latter the problem gets tied up more closely with evolutionism and vitalism.

The student will read *Mind-Energy* in the hope of finding an elucidation of difficult points in Bergson's doctrine rather than with the expectation of discovering a new phase or development of this philosophy as a whole. The volume consists of seven lectures and essays, with titles and dates as follows: I., Life and Consciousness (1911); II., The Soul and the Body (1912); III., "Phantasms of the Living" and Psychical Research (1913); IV., Dreams (1901); V., Memory of the Present and False Recognition (1908); VI., Intellectual Effort (1902); VII., Brain and Thought: A Philosophical Illusion (1904). We are told by the translator, H. Wildon Carr, that the essays were chosen by Bergson "with the view of illustrating his concept that reality is fundamentally a spiritual activity" (p. v). We are further told that the term *Mind-Energy* implies and depends on a metaphysical concept. It is impossible "to conceive an ultimate dualism—mind and matter as the co-existence of two independent realms of reality." The new concept is of a "reality with which life and consciousness are identical, as distinct from the concept of a reality independent of life and conditioning it" (p. vii).

This statement of the thesis of the volume leads one to expect new light upon the central problem of Bergson's philosophy. This problem concerns the relation of life and consciousness, and of life,

consciousness, and matter. The ambiguities in these relations may be set forth as follows. Bergson in general seems to insist that reality is psychical and that it is life.¹ On the one hand, Bergson certainly identifies, in some sense of the terms, life and consciousness. Consciousness is said to be "co-extensive with universal life."² The question is raised: what is the principle "that has only to let go its tension—may we say to *detend*—in order to *extend* . . .?" The answer is that for lack of a better word it is to be called consciousness (*C. E.*, p. 237). Life as a whole is described as a wave which rises, and this wave is said to be consciousness (*C. E.*, p. 269). These, and many other statements, seem to imply that reality, life, and consciousness are one. But, on the other hand, we find statements apparently in conflict with this. In *Matter and Memory* consciousness is said to be a synonym of real action or immediate efficacy. Its rôle is to preside over action and to effect choice.³ Bergson defends the notion of unconscious psychical states, so that while the real is psychical throughout, apparently it is not conscious throughout.⁴ The cumulative past, it is said, presses "against the portals of consciousness that would fain leave it outside. The cerebral mechanism is arranged just so as to drive back into the unconscious almost the whole of the past" (*C. E.*, p. 5). Clearness of consciousness varies with the number and precision of the movements of an organism. Consciousness is "the light that plays around the zone of possible actions or potential activity which surrounds the action really performed by the living being. It signifies hesitation or choice" (*C. E.*, p. 144). These and similar passages apparently limit consciousness to moments of life. It is to be found at the intersection of life and matter. It can not therefore be identified with life. Life is of the psychological order (*C. E.*, p. 257). But within the field of the living we distinguish the unconscious psychical from the conscious.

These inconsistencies are so apparent that they suggest their origin in over-simplification in interpretation. There are various statements bearing on the question and qualifying phrases that need to be noted. It is with "universal" life that consciousness is co-extensive. The principle whose detension produces extension is called consciousness, "for want of a better word." And there is added immediately: "But we do not mean the narrowed con-

¹ *Creative Evolution*, trans. by Mitchell, 1911, p. 257. Hereinafter referred to as *C. E.*

² *C. E.*, p. 186; cf. pp. 257, 270, 362-3.

³ *Matière et Mémoire*, neuvième édition, 1913, p. 153.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 152 et seq.

sciousness that functions in each of us. Our own consciousness is the consciousness of a certain living being, placed in a certain point of space; and though it does indeed move in the same direction as its principle, it is continually drawn the opposite way" (*C. E.*, p. 237). Somewhere Bergson points out the difference between the mere absence of consciousness and consciousness present but nullified, suppressed.

Perhaps the way out of these difficulties is to be found in these considerations. Life and consciousness are *by right* coextensive, but are not in fact. The limitations of the organs of consciousness, *e.g.*, the cerebrum, serve to compress consciousness as within a vise, to use a Bergsonian figure. Consciousness is largely nullified, but is present; hence the false appearance that consciousness and life are not coextensive. The consciousness that functions in each one of us, the individualized consciousness, is a limitation of life. The realm of the unconscious psychical is by right conscious. Every organism is, so to speak, as conscious as conditions permit. Life is conscious wherever possible. Perhaps in the distinction between intuition and intelligence (originally interpenetrating in the life impulse), another relevant consideration is to be found. The intuition of duration brings the vision of life in its original character; there is, so to speak, a sort of consciousness appropriate to life itself and of this we get glimpses through intuition. But the individualized consciousness, utilizing an organ of action and choice, characterized by the dissociation of intuition and intellect, and affected by the intellect's concern with matter, is a consciousness limited to the present, constituting the intersection of life and matter. One is reminded here of the distinction between the superficial (spatialized) self and the deeper self of *Time and Free Will*. This distinction between a universal life-consciousness in which all potentialities interpenetrate and the individualized consciousness in which these are dissociated and "spatialized" (and perhaps checked or nullified here and there) seems to be implied when Bergson states that it is consciousness "or rather supra-consciousness, that is at the origin of life. Consciousness, or supra-consciousness, is the name for the rocket whose extinguished fragments fall back as matter. . . . But this consciousness, which is a *need of creation*, is made manifest to itself only where creation is possible. It lies dormant where life is condemned to automatism; it awakens as soon as the possibility of a choice is restored" (*C. E.*, p. 261).

There seems to be, in the books to which we have been referring, no explicit treatment of the difficulty. In the last two para-

graphs several suggestions that may bear on the question have been collated; the use of them that has been indicated is, of course, frankly conjectural, and it is not easy to determine how well it represents Bergson. But so far the results may be summarized as follows: Life is of the psychological order, and is reality, the reality that endures and is creative. In right, life is universally conscious or is something like consciousness; in fact, it is only in part conscious, though in essence psychical. The consciousness of any organism is a residue—it is all that can get through in given conditions. In a sense, the materiality of that life is precisely the suppression or limitation of life, the nullification of consciousness. In so far as consciousness has adopted the habits of matter, life and consciousness are dormant (*C. E.*, p. 267).

Assuming that we have here the direction in which Bergson would meet the difficulty, we find that the difficulty has not vanished, but has changed its form. For now the nullification of consciousness must be accounted for. Why and how is it nullified? Why should life be in right conscious throughout but in fact conscious only in part? Why is consciousness ever dormant? Why does life renounce consciousness, and why does psychical living reality detend in order to extend? Why does consciousness adopt the habits of matter? How is unconsciousness to be explained?

Here our attention must be focussed on the double rôle of matter. Matter is responsible for the nullification of consciousness. Life meets matter as an obstacle. The configuration of matter determines the way in which the original potencies of life shall be broken up and the directions of the evolutionary processes (*C. E.*, p. 257). Matter, again, while an obstacle to life, is also life's materials for creation. Out of matter life fashions its instruments. In order to attain to higher creations, matter is requisite as challenge and as means. When life has fashioned a form, it is limited by that which it has created. It is conscious only in so far as the embodiment it has devised will permit. Intellect develops to master the geometrical order. Matter is consequently the impediment to life and its plastic material.

Granting the existence of matter, this is intelligible. But can we refrain from asking why there is matter at all? This is crucial in Bergson's philosophy. There can be little doubt that matter is represented, on the one hand, as a product of life, of the detension of "supra-consciousness," "universal life," or the fundamental principle of reality. But why the detension? *Matter and Memory* is devoted to the mind-matter problem. It "affirms the

reality of spirit, the reality of matter." It seeks to "attenuate largely, if not to suppress, the theoretical difficulties that the dualism has always raised. . . ." ⁵ Either life and reality are synonymous, and matter arises from life, or life and matter are equally derivative, as conjoint manifestations of the real. The latter position, although suggested in some passages, is hardly consistent with the general tenor of this philosophy. The former position requires that the genesis of matter be accounted for. Here, as already indicated, Bergson is ambiguous. Matter, on the one hand, is the debris left by life, the current opposing life, the inverse of life. Yet matter as obstacle determines the particular streams of development. Matter is on the one hand given a certain independence, a structure and character of its own. The material order of things is the result of intelligence, but materiality is there to begin with. If things are moulded by intelligence, yet intelligence conforms to materiality.

Were Bergson to reply by stating that there is a distinction between life as prior to matter (universal life?) and living forms, and life in its developmental currents opposed by matter and utilizing it, the problem is simply pushed further back. For the arising of matter still remains unexplained.

In short, materiality on the one hand tends to be viewed as a mere negative shadow, expressing life's limitations and sinuosities. On the other hand, it tends to assume a large measure of positive character, and forms the rocks on which the wave of life breaks, defining possibilities of creation. If matter is merely the degradation of life, it is also at the very threshold of life, possessing its own lines of cleavage. It is pure inertia. But the inert nevertheless determines in part the dissociation of the immensity of potentialities which is life. ⁶ "Life as a whole, from its original impulsion . . . will appear as a wave which rises, and which is opposed by the descending movement of matter" (*C. E.*, p. 269). Consciousness "conquers" matter (*C. E.*, p. 267). It organizes it (*C. E.*, p. 26). But then it is there to be conquered and organized. This same difficulty reappears in the passage "from freedom to mechanical necessity by way of inversion." We are told that the "geometrical order has no need of explanation, being purely and simply the suppression of the inverse order" (*C. E.*, pp. 236-7). But must not the suppression be accounted for?

The relation of life and consciousness turns on the relation of life and matter, and the latter relation is unclear. Life and

⁵ *Matière et Mémoire*, p. ii.

⁶ *C. E.*, pp. 98-9; p. 258.

consciousness are neutralized and checked by materiality. Materiality neutralizes and yet seems to be just this fact of neutralization. The discussion of Quality and Quantity in *Matter and Memory* seems to imply that matter is after all just a name for the limitation of consciousness which condenses in one moment a vast series of vibrations. (Vibrations of what?) Again, we learn that there is an order inherent in materiality. It is the intellect itself (*C. E.*, p. 153). But in order that intellect might become distinct, the dissociation of the original potentialities must occur, and this dissociation is in part due to the resistance of materiality. Intellect and materiality appear together, but it is not clear how this can be explained without positing materiality to begin with.

Giving due allowance for the effect of metaphor and the varying purposes of exposition, there still seems to be a genuine difficulty involved. If matter and life appear conjointly from the real, the real is not identical with life and consciousness unless "life" has two different meanings. But if reality is life, the genesis of matter is inexplicable. If, finally, it is claimed that these difficulties arise only because we are putting in terms of intelligence that for which intuition alone is commensurate, we can only ask why such a philosophy should attempt to give the genesis of matter or to account for life's partial surrender of its right to consciousness.

Mind-Energy throws little light upon these questions. The first, second, and seventh essays are those bearing most closely on the question. The other essays deal with more limited topics and are interesting mainly as extensions of general principles. The essay on "Life and Consciousness" is concerned with the "three-fold problem of consciousness, of life and their relation" (p. 3). "Theoretically . . . everything living might be conscious. *In principle*, consciousness is co-extensive with life" (p. 11). But this is not so in fact. The faculty of choice is exercised throughout the scale of animal life, but with increasing vagueness as we approach the bottom of the scale. And consciousness means choice. The question, then, is: Are all living beings conscious, or does consciousness cover a part only of the domain of life? We learn that it is "extremely likely . . . that consciousness, originally immanent in all that lives, is dormant where there is no longer spontaneous movement, and awakens when life tends to free activity" (pp. 14-15). "The variations in the intensity of our consciousness seem then to correspond to the more or less considerable sum of choice, or . . . to the amount of creation, which our conduct requires" (p. 15). "Consciousness and matter appear to

us . . . as radically different forms of existence, even as antagonistic forms . . .” (p. 17). Life finds a way of reconciling matter and consciousness, freedom and necessity. “Placed at the confluence of consciousness and matter, sensation condenses into the duration which . . . characterizes our consciousness, immense periods of what we can call by analogy the duration of things” (p. 21). “. . . Consciousness appears as a force seeking to insert itself in matter in order to . . . turn it to its profit” (p. 22). “We may surmise that these two realities, matter and consciousness, are derived from a common source. If . . . matter is the inverse of consciousness . . . neither matter nor consciousness can be explained apart from one another” (p. 23). “Things have happened just as though an immense current of consciousness, interpenetrated with potentialities of every kind, had traversed matter to draw it towards organization and make it . . . an instrument of freedom. But consciousness has had a narrow escape from being ensnared. Matter . . . bends it to its own automatism . . .” (p. 26). Matter distinguishes, resolves into individualities and personalities tendencies confused in the original impulse of life. “By the resistance matter offers and by the docility with which we endow it, [it] is at one and the same time obstacle, instrument, and stimulus” (p. 29).

The second essay, on “The Soul and the Body,” contains nothing essentially new to readers of the earlier books. We are told that “the invariable contrivance of consciousness, from its most humble origin . . . is to convert physical determinism to its own ends” (p. 44). “The philosopher ought to descend within himself, and then, remounting to the surface, follow the gradual movement by which consciousness detends, extends, and prepares to evolve in space” (p. 46). This materialization or externalization means the “insertion of mind in matter.” The familiar thesis concerning the function of the brain is expounded; the brain “is the organ of attention to life” (p. 59).

The essay on “Brain and Thought” aims to show that the hypothesis of psycho-physiological parallelism involves a fundamental self-contradiction. Realism and Idealism are defined as opposed notation systems, and the thesis is maintained that the hypothesis obtains its plausibility because of a “surreptitious passing from one definite notation-system to an opposite system without giving or taking notice of the substitution” (p. 234).

After the statements given above concerning the ambiguities in the relations of life, consciousness, and matter, it is hardly necessary to comment at length on these essays. In the language of the

translator, the "great factor in evolution is a kind of unconsciousness" (p. vii). "It is not an Absolute . . ." but a "restriction of the consciousness which life possesses in right, a restriction contrived by life in order to fashion the instrumentality of efficient action. . . . The philosophic problem before us today, if we accept the new concept, is to explain the nature and genesis of unconsciousness." (p. viii). But it is precisely the questions of why life foregoes this right, why it restricts consciousness, and why unconsciousness arises, that the book leaves unanswered; and these questions, moreover, arise from the doctrines laid down in the earlier books. If Bergson's statements on these and allied questions are to be not merely formulae, but the outlines of a metaphysics, these questions must be directly faced.

There is, however, a line of thought suggested here and there, and especially in the first essay of the new volume, that tempts the reader to conjecture. One wonders whether Bergson may not be led ultimately to attempt the solution of the problems discussed above by some moral or teleological principle. We may recall Fichte: the final grounds for the existence of the Non-Ego reside in the function of the Non-Ego as conditioning, and affording the opportunity for, moral development. The original *Anstos* is otherwise unaccountable. Now is matter and unconsciousness to be accounted for by Bergson in an analogous way? Matter as obstacle and stimulus, its existence explained only by its function in forcing life to contrive unconsciousness in order that, by some sort of canalization of the vital impulse, life might attain higher levels of creation—is Bergson's philosophy drifting towards such a view? Consider these passages: "Philosophers who have speculated on the meaning of life . . . have failed to take sufficient notice of an indication which nature itself has given us. Nature warns us by a clear sign that our destination is attained. That sign is joy." Joy, as contrasted with pleasure, indicates the direction in which life is thrusting. Joy "announces that life has succeeded. . . . Wherever there is joy, there is creation; the richer the creation, the deeper the joy" (p. 29). Is this philosophy, like the symphony of Beethoven, to conclude with a Hymn to Joy? "If, then, in every domain the triumph of life is creation, must we not suppose that human life has its goal in a creation which . . . can be pursued by all men—creation of self by self, the growing of personality" (pp. 30-31)? "Automatism and repetition, which prevail everywhere except in man, should warn us that living forms are only halts. . . . The artist's standpoint is . . . not final. The standpoint of the moralist is higher. In man alone the vital movement pursues its way with-

out hindrance, thrusting through that work of art, the human body . . . the creative current of the moral life" (pp. 31-32). "(If) preservation and even intensification of personality are not only possible but even probable after the disintegration of the body, shall we not suspect that, in its passage through the matter which it finds here, consciousness is tempering itself like steel and preparing itself for a more efficient action, an intenser life" (p. 35)? Are these passages merely incidental, or are they indicative of a new stage to come in Bergson's philosophy?

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JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE. Janvier-Mars 1921. *Jules Lachelier*. (pp. 1-20): E. BOUTROUX, and *Souvenirs d'entretiens avec Jules Lachelier*. (pp. 21-26): C. BOUGLÉ.—These two papers give a glimpse into the scope and energy of Lachelier's thought, and his finely spiritual humanism, both of which are inadequately revealed in the few pages that he published on "The nature of the syllogism," and on "The basis of induction." In these works he makes a distinction between a "logic of quantity" and a "logic of qualities." He approached metaphysics through logic and psychology, and while accepting the account of the physical sciences as true of a certain aspect of existence, he finds their categories inadequate to describe "necessary being" itself. He thought, "In the last analysis that which is important for a philosopher to understand is that reality is reason." *Les facteurs kantians de la philosophie allemande de la fin du XVIII^e et du commencement du XIX^e siècles* (pp. 27-47) (*Continuée et à suivre*): VICTOR DELBOS.—This is the third of an interesting series of articles on this subject, and describes the relations of Schelling and Hegel to Kantianism. *Études Critiques. A propos de l'évolution de la pensée juridique contemporaine*. (pp. 49-75): G. DAVY.—Contrasts two views as to the function of the judiciary in the development of law. F. GÉNY, in his theory, has sought to preserve the traditional absolutism of the statute law. Judges are merely "to complete the statute" by interpreting customs in the light of it. Lambert, Saleilles, and others take a more radical position and regard the judiciary as a "supplementary source of law." In fulfilling this function, judges not only interpret, but also constitute custom. Each of these two factions finds the